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Summary findings
Johnson,  Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) found that, in  Wealthy OECD economies and some Eastern
post-communist economies, the unofficial economy's  European economies find themselves in the "good
share of GDP is determined by the extent of control  equilibrium" of relatively low regulatory and tax burden
rights held by bureaucrats and politicians.  (not necessarily low statutory tax rates), sizable revenue
Exploring in detail the role of taxation and bribery,  mobilization, good rule of law and control  of corruption,
and using data from an expanded data set of 49 Latin  and a small unofficial economy.
American, OECD, and transition economies, Johnson,  Several countries in Latin America and the former
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobat6n find that the unofficial  Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a
economy accounts for a larger share of  GDP where  "bad equilibrium": the discretionary application of heavy
there is great bureaucratic  inefficiency and discretion,  regulatory and tax burdens, the weak rule of law, heavy
and where firms experience a greater tax and regulatory  bribery, and an active unofficial economy.
burden,  as well as more bribery and corruption.  The  In this large country sample (unlike in the earlier
unofficial economy is also much larger where there is less  framework for transition economies only), the authors
state revenue and where the rule of law is weak. They  find that it is the ineffective and discretionary application
also find that countries with a larger unofficial economy  of regulatory and tax regimes in many countries - not
tend to grow more slowly. Thus, this framework suggests  higher tax rates by itself - that increase the size of the
an additional channel whereby corruption and ineffective  unofficial economy. The tax burden reported  by firms
regulatory and tax administration can result in lower  appears to be more a function of regulatory and
growth: the unofficial economy.  bureaucratic inefficiency and discretion rather than of
tax rates alone.
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The study of unofficial actives in the development  field was typically done from a
labor market perspective  (Todaro,  Tokman  and many others), stressing the labor market
regulatory regime in understanding  the evolution of the informal sector.  This "sector" was
traditionally studied independently  of the dynamics of the overall economy. Alternatively,
we can take a political economy perspective, asking what motivates politicians to exercise
certain rights on enterprises,  and analyzing  the public finance implications of such actions
by politicians. Within a public finance framework we can then attempt to integrate the
analysis  of the unofficial economy into the dynamics of the overall economy.
Politicization  of economic activity means  the exercise  of control rights over firms by
politicians and bureaucrats. In most countries politicians maintain  property rights in firms,
typically in the form of residual control rights as defined by Grossman  and Hart (1986).
These  control rights may have served an ideological  agenda  in the past.  But they are often
used to further the private agenda of politicians and bureaucrats,  and particularly so
nowadays where ideological  differences have narrowed. A recent but rapidly growing
literature has established  the presence  of these problems  in countries as diverse as Peru,
France,  Russia  and Ukraine  (de Soto 1989,  Shleifer and Vishny 1  993, Kaufmann  and
Siegelbaum  1  997). But how widespread  are  these rights and how damaging  are their
effects around  the world?
For Eastern  Europe  and the former Soviet Union since 1  989, Johnson, Kaufmann
and Shleifer 1  997 (thereafter referred as JKS) show that businesses  respond  to
politicization by going "underground."  Instead  of registering  their activities, managers
prefer not to pay taxes and not to benefit from key publicly provided services, such as legal
enforcement of contracts.  For the economies  in transition from communism  there is
evidence of a downward spiral, in which firms leaving the official sector reduce  state
revenue,  which reduces publicly provided services, and further reduces  the incentive to
register in the official sector. Most of the former Soviet Union has thus ended  up in a "bad"
equilibrium with low tax revenue, high unofficial economy, and low quality of publicly
provided  services.
Our previous  work, focusing on transition economies  (JKS), suggests  three general
propositions. First, that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP  should be higher when
there is more regulation and more  discretion for officials regarding  how the regulatory
system operates. Second, a higher  share of the unofficial economy should be correlated
with lower tax revenue as a percent of GDP. Third, a larger unofficial economy should be
correlated  with weaker publicly provided services, as measured  by corruption and the "rule
of law" (particularly the legal protection provided to private sector business  investments).'
The overall  framework of JKS can be applied and tested more broadly as well, which
we undertake  in this paper for a larger  sample of countries as well as for a wider set of
public finance variables.  We generalize  our previous  framework and suggest that the
politicization of economic  life can be usefully thought of as exercise by politicians of
control rights over business anywhere.  Such control rights may include regulatory powers
' Loayza  (1995)  has similar  theoretical  results  for Latin  America. In his model  unregistered  firms use but do not pay for public
services,  thus leading  to congestion  costs  for public  goods, such as roads, and thus lower  growth.
1over privatized and private firms, the ability to regulate and restrict entry, control over the
use of land and real estate that private businesses  occupy, the  determination and
collection of taxes on businesses,  the rights to inspect firms and close them if regulations
are violated, control over international  trade and foreign exchange  transactions, and in
some cases, even the power to set prices.  Typically, many politicians use these rights to
pursue  their own interest, such as maintaining  employment  in certain firms, supporting
politically friendly and punishing  of politically unfriendly entrepreneurs,  and subsidizing  their
allies.  Politicians  can also use these rights to enrich themselves by offering firms relief
from regulation  in exchange  for bribes. 2 Political control generally  reduces profitability of
doing business,  and therefore adversely  influences entrepreneurial  activity and economic
growth. 3 When profits or potential profits are taken away from firms through regulation,
taxation, or corruption, entrepreneurs  choose not to start firms or expand less rapidly than
they might otherwise.  But entrepreneurs  have another option, namely to operate
unofficially. 4 JKS hypothesize  that in many economies  one of the consequences  of
politicization has been  the emergence  of the unofficial economy, in which firms can avoid
taxes and regulations.
Specifically, we show that the movement of production into the unofficial economy
has significant consequences  for public finance.  Since firms in the unofficial sector largely
escape  taxation, the reallocation  of resources  into that sector undermines  tax collections,
and consequently  the ability of the government  to provide public goods in the official
sector.  Such public goods include law and order, effective tax and regulatory institutions,
and relatively uncorrupted public administration. The lack of provision of such market-
supporting public goods makes  operating in the official sector even less attractive to firms,
and can set off a collapse of public finances as more  and more  firms escape  into the
unofficial economy.
Economies  may find themselves in either of two very different equilibria. In the
first, tax distortions and regulations  are low, government  revenues  are high, the provision
of public goods in the official sector is good, and therefore the unofficial sector is small. In
the second  equilibrium, taxes and regulations  are prohibitive, public finances are precarious,
public good provision in the official sector is inadequate,  and as a consequence,  much of
the economic activity is concentrated in the unofficial sector.  If firms are more productive
in the official than in the unofficial sector, the second equilibrium  is associated  with worse
aggregate  performance  than the first.
By stressing the role of  politicization and depoliticization of  economic activity,  we
focus on the  political and institutional determinants of  entrepreneurial response, and in
particular, on the allocation of  resources between the official  and the  unofficial sectors.
The role of depoliticization has been stressed in the study of  economies in transition, as
well  as  the  importance  of  building  market-supporting rather  than  market-distorting
institutions. 5 In  this  tradition,  our  paper focuses on  the  implications  of  excessive
2 Shleifer  and Vishny  (1993); Kaufmann  (1997).
3 De Soto (1989).
4 Kaufmann  and Kaliberda  (1996); Kaufmann  (1997);  Loayza  (1996)
See Frydman  and Rapaczynski  (1991),  Boycko,  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1995, 1996),  Kaufmann  and Siegelbaum  (1997),  and JKS
2regulation, taxation and corruption for the government's budget and for provision of public
goods required by a market economy.
We emphasize  the public finance determinants  and implications of corruption and the
unofficial economy. We do so by focusing our empirical analysis  on the consequences  of
the escape  by new firms from the official economy on the government's budget, and on
the provision of potentially beneficial  public goods as well as public "bads" such as bribery
and corruption.  Law and order, protection of property rights and bureaucratic efficiency are
key public goods that can be measured  empirically. Further, we address  the issues relating
to the financing of a range of market-supporting  government  institutions, including
regulatory  agencies,  a reasonably  honest public administration, and so forth.  We look at
the relationship  between taxes and regulations,  government  budgets, and the provision of
public goods, and examine  the consequences  of the condition of public finances for the
unofficial economy. 6
In the next four sections of the paper, we present a simple model, discuss some key
assumptions  of the model, describe  our data, and present the evidence on the effects of
political control on the unofficial economy. We conclude stressing some salient policy and
institutional implications.
II.  A Simple  Model
The basic model, drawn from JKS, captures some of the ideas described above. We
consider  the allocation of labor between the official and the unofficial sectors of the
economy. The government imposes  taxes on the official sector and provides public goods
from the tax revenues. These public goods, such as law and order, increase  the
productivity of firms in the official sector.  The unofficial sector does not pay official taxes,
but neither does it have access  to the public goods provided by the government. Instead,
it may pay fees to private protection agencies  to provide  some public goods, such as
protection from thieves and contract enforcement. 7 We examine  the allocation of labor
between the two sectors, and its implications  for tax revenues,  law and order, and the
efficiency of the economy.
We present here a sketch of the model described  in more detail in JKS. Denote by
t  the generalized  tax rate on output in the official sector.  The generalized  tax rate  t
includes taxation, regulation, and corruption (that is, bribes).  Taxes raise revenue  for the
government, but some of the generalized  taxes, such as regulation and bribes, do not.  For
now, let t be the share of output that the government  in various ways removes from each
firm in the official sector and obtains for its budget.
Let T be the tax revenue  in the official sector and Q be the quantity of the public
(1997).
6 Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1997) present cross-country measures of institutions (aggregated by regions), which are
broadly consistent with our findings for transition economies.  They report that these institutional variables have a significant
effect on measures of official per capita income in transition economies.
7 A more elaborate version of this model would allow public officials to "privately" provide protection from excessive
regulatory and tax harassment, in exchange for bribes.
3good, such as law and order provided to firms operating in the official sector; i.e. here  Q
captures the public goods from which firms operating unofficially can be excluded. For
instance, firms in the unofficial sector do not have access  to police, courts, public
protection of property rights or administrative assistance  from the government. In
contrast, such public services as roads are accessible  to all firms, even those in the
unofficial sector, and hence Q does not properly  capture these goods.
Let L be the aggregate  labor force, and let the wage rate be normalized  to one.
Finally, let F and / be the subscripts denoting the official and the unofficial sectors
respectively, so LF  and L,  denote the labor employed,  JlF  and H,  the after-tax profits, and
YF  and Y,  the  output  in each sector.
The production function in the official sector is assumed  to be given by:
(1)  YF  =  QLF,
The quantity of the public good directly enhances  the productivity of the official
sector.  As a consequence,  after tax profits are given by:
(2)  17F  =  (1-t)QLF  - LF.
Tax revenue, T, is given by  T =  tQLF  . We assume  that the supply of public goods is
increasing  and concave in tax revenue; that is,  Q =  Q (T),  with  Q' >  0  and  Q" <  0.
This does not mean that government resources  are spent entirely on the provision of public
goods; indeed,  a large portion might be stolen or wasted.  We only assume  that at least
some share of the marginal dollar is spent on public goods.
This assumption  raises an important point, namely  that the cost of providing market
supporting public institutions may be low; thus the JKS assumption  that a decline in
government  revenue  leads  to a deterioration in the supply of public goods may  miss the
mark.  Nevertheless,  our assumption  may still apply, because,  despite their enormous
benefits, market-supporting  public goods are often among  the first to be cut when the
budget deteriorates. In such a situation, the government  may be weak or under pressure
by powerful interests  to maintain  the level of less socially useful expenditures,  such as
agricultural and industrial subsidies  and defense spending.
From the government's  budget  constraint,  one obtains  Q  =  Q(tQLF).  Eliminating Q
from the right hand side, we write Q = q(tLd.  For q expressed  only as a function of tLF,
it is easy to verify that  q' >  0 and, in some cases, q" >  0.  This is the first possible
increasing  return in the JKS model: as public good provision increases,  so does the
productivity of the private sector and the tax revenues  that it furnishes, which finances a
further increase  in public good provision.  The q function exhibits increasing returns if the
government  is sufficiently productive in converting revenues  into public goods.  For
example,  if  Q(T)  =  7T, and  a  >  1/2,  then q"  >  0.
Diagram 1 presents the equilibria in the model detailed in JKS.  In equilibrium,  the
labor market clears so that  LI + LF  =  L.  The figure graphs  the tax revenue  and quality of
public goods against  the share of the unofficial economy. The solid line shows that the
4higher is the share of the unofficial economy, the lower are the official tax collections, and
hence  the supply of public goods to the official sector.  The dotted line -the firm mobility
function-shows  that the higher  is the supply of public goods in the official economy, the
fewer firms choose to operate unofficially.  The dotted line generally cuts the solid line
from below.
In general,  there are  three equilibria  in this model: one in which all resources  are
concentrated  in the official sector, one in which all resources  are in the unofficial sector,
and a knife-edge  equilibrium in which the two sectors coexist.  The existence of the
extreme equilibria is independent of the possible convexity of the  q  function; that is, there
is a second, and totally separate, source of increasing  returns to sector size.
When all resources  are concentrated in the unofficial sector, government  tax
collections in the official sector are zero, hence so is the amount of the public good
supplied in that sector, as well as its productivity.  As a consequence,  all firms choose to
stay in the unofficial sector.  This equilibrium is stable. When nearly all firms are in the
unofficial sector, government revenues  do not suffice to provide  the level of public goods
needed  to draw firms back into the official sector; in fact, further resources  move to the
unofficial sector. 8
Similarly, if all resources  are concentrated  in the official sector, the tax revenues  (T)
and public good provision (Q) in that sector are high enough that all firms choose  to stay
there.  The equilibrium is stable because,  when only a few firms are operating unofficially,
it is to their advantage  to switch back and access  to official public goods  (in Diagram  1
the dotted line is below the solid line when the size of the unofficial sector is near zero).
By contrast, the knife-edge intermediate  equilibrium is unstable. As we can see in
Diagram 1, if starting from this equilibrium,  a firm tips over from the unofficial to the
official sector, the resources  of the official sector rise, hence so do tax collections and the
quantity of public goods supplied, and finally, the productivity in that sector.  More firms
then switch into the official sector, and the intermediate  equilibrium breaks down.
Although the JKS simple formal model is static, it can be given a "cobweb" dynamic
interpretation suggested  by the arrows in the above Diagram 1.  Suppose  that an economy
because  of a positive budgetary  shock ends up on the "good" side of the intermediate
equilibrium,  that is, at a point where the unofficial economy is relatively small and tax
revenues  are relatively large.  Firms that are operating unofficially then recognize  that the
combination  of taxes and public goods in the official sector is attractive enough for them to
switch.  As they move, tax revenues  in the official sector rise, and hence so does the
provision of public goods in that sector.  As this happens,  more firms operating unofficially
switch, and so on,  until this virtuous cycle leads to a fully official economy.  Conversely,
8  In Diagram  1,  this equilibrium  is stable  because  the dotted  line is above  the solid line when  all, or nearly all,  the resources  are
in the unofficial  sector.
9 The forces  causing  the multiplicity  of equilibria  in this model  are general,  and are closely  related to the idea  of fiscal
increasing  returns  of Blanchard  and Summers, even  though  more  realistic  specifications  would generate  less extreme  outcomes.
Blanchard  and Summers  (1987)  present  a model  in which  an increase  in government  spending  reduces  unemployment,  raises  the
level of economic  activity,  and may recover  more in increased  tax revenues  than the government  has spent  in the first place.
5suppose  that an economy ends up on the bad side of the intermediate equilibrium,  with a
relatively large unofficial economy and low tax revenues. Firms operating officially then
recognize  that they are better off in the unofficial sector and move. Their move has a
deleterious  effect on the budget and the provision of public goods in the official sector,
which causes more firms to switch to the unofficial economy. This vicious cycle ends up
at the extreme equilibrium where the whole economy is unofficial.'°
Diagram 1:
The Model:












U = 0  Unofficial Economy  U*=1
Share
To interpret this model and its predictions, it is useful to think of an augmented
framework in which, for reasons  outside the model, some  firms choose to operate in the
official sector (for example, state firms dealing mostly with the state) and others choose  to
operate  in the unofficial sector (for example,  they infringe on patents).  In this case, the
forces that we describe still operate, but both sectors coexist in equilibrium. What does
10  Costs of congestion in the unofficial sector, suggested by Loayza (1996), put a lower limit on the proportion of the economy
that remains official. Similar results would emerge from increasing probability of detection as the extent of unofficial operations
grows.  Thus, in practice the model's  "extreme" outcomes ought to be seen as illustrating very large or very small unofficial
economy outcomes, rather than the absolute dominance or absence of unofficial activities.  Yet we observe that the evidence
from the former Soviet Union and some other countries indicate few limits  imposed by the (rather small) congestion costs or
likelihood of penalty for unofficial activities, suggesting that a priori the variations in the extent of unofficial economies can be
very large.
6the analysis  say about such situations?
The key prediction of the model is the potential separation of economies  into two
distinct groups.  In one, the government  offers a sufficiently attractive combination of tax
rates, regulations, honest public administration  and public goods  that most firms choose to
stay in the official sector.  In this group, government  revenues  suffice to provide the public
goods, and the unofficial sector is small because  the government  outcompetes  it.  In the
other group, the government does not offer firms a sufficiently attractive combination of
tax burden, regulations, and public goods (including  rule of law and an honest and efficient
public administration)  to keep  them operating officially, and hence many of them end up in
the large unofficial sector, which offers a more attractive combination. The government
budget in these countries does not suffice to offer more public goods to firms operating in
the official sector, and hence the unofficial sector wins the competition for firms.
In sum, the model is partly driven by the assumption  of increasing  returns to the
provision of  Q.  In particular, there are a number  of  reasons  for increasing returns in the
legal protection function.  First, higher  or better provision of legal protection for
investments means higher productivity for the official private sector, which increases  tax
revenues  and enables  the government  to further improve legal protection.  Second, if legal
protection for investment improves, firms will move  out of the unofficial  sector and into the
official sector.  This movement of firms will improve tax revenues  and provide  the revenues
that can be used for a further improvement of legal protection.  Third, the government  may
become  more  efficient  in its provision of legal protection when that protection already
operates  at a high level, i.e. there are economies  of scale in the provision of law and order.
For example,  if there is already  a well functioning court system, measures  to stamp out
organized  crime are more likely to be effective.  Finally, and not modeled  explicitly, if the
probability  of tax evasion  detection increases  with less  tax evaders, then firms would be
more likely to comply with taxes when fewer firms are in the unofficial sector.
These  are the stylized predictions of a stylized model. We evaluate these predictions
empirically below.  But first, we revisit a few  key assumptions  responsible  for these
results.
The potential bifurcation of economies  into exhibiting a large or small share of
unofficial activities and their divergent institutional and public finance outcomes matters for
overall economic  performance. If one also makes  the plausible  assumption  that the official
sector is more productive at generating  public goods, then the overall growth performance
of economies  with a small unofficial sector is superior. There are several reasons  why the
government  may be more efficient at converting revenue  into public goods than private
sector competitors such as the mafia or other protection agencies:  there are increasing
returns to the production of some goods, such as defense  and laws; the government
already  has some  expertise at producing  some of these goods; private providers  might not
be able to credibly commit to long term delivery of some  services. On the nexus between
the unofficial economy and overall growth, see also Loayza 1995.  Further, the behavior of
firms in the official and unofficial economy  differ regarding  perceived risk and thus
investment behavior. Higher private investment in the official economy would also
positively affect long term growth.
Ill.  On Key  Assumptions  of the Model.
7A.  Taxation,  Regulation,  and  Corruption.
The analytical  results  of the JKS model are driven by the  assumption  that  excessive
taxes force  firms out  of the  official  sector.  Taxation  itself,  however,  has an offsetting
benefit.  At  least on the increasing part of the  Laffer curve, higher taxes  raise more money
for the government,  some of  which  is spent on public goods.  This is not the  case with
generalized "regulatory"  taxes.  These are more detrimental  to the official  sector than  high
taxes  proper, since they bring all the distortionary  effects  but no government  revenue.  If
we included regulation  in the  model, the tendency  toward  bifurcation  would  be even
stronger.  In the  empirical work,  we consider both taxation  and regulation.
The effects  of corruption  are somewhat  different  from those of taxation  and
regulation.  Entrepreneurs generally pay bribes precisely to avoid paying taxes  or following
regulations,  and therefore  corruption  reflects  payments  to evade government  control.  In
general, the  higher the  level of taxation  and regulation  (t), the  greater are the  bribes that
politicians  can extract  from  entrepreneurs  in return for excusing them  from  paying taxes or
following  regulations.  Tax and regulatory burdens are therefore  highly  correlated with  the
level of corruption,  which,  in turn,  can serve as a proxy for t.  Similar to regulation,
however,  corruption  does not  raise any revenues for the government.
B.  Government Does Not Restrict  the Movement of Firms.
A key assumption  in the JKS  model is that  entrepreneurs  are free to  switch
resources from  the official  to  the unofficial  sector in seeking a better  mix of taxes  and
public  goods.  But the government  may be able to  punish anyone who  leaves the official
sector through  political  repression or particularly  strict  enforcement  of laws and regulations.
For example, it  could use tax  revenue to penalize firms that  are operating unofficially
directly,  through  raids and expropriations.  A government  that  establishes  itself  as a
successful  repressive  monopolist  would  charge high taxes,  collect  substantial  revenues, yet
provide few  public goods,  instead using the  revenues to  line its own  pockets  and to fuel
the machinery  of repression.  Although  we do not  model this  explicitly,  some countries  in
the  Former Soviet  block,  such as Belarus and Uzbekistan,  both repressive  states,  appear to
be outliers  in the data,  and are consistent  with  a model of a monopoly  government  that
restricts  mobility,  collects  taxes yet  produces few  public goods.
C.  Labor Supply
One final  assumption  that  warrants  a comment  is that  of fixed  labor supply.  In our
model, entrepreneurs  move between  sectors  in search of the  best combination  of taxes and
public goods.  Another  response to  poor government  performance  is not to produce at all,
or to  produce in the household sector,  which  uses no public goods and pays no taxes to
either the  government  or the mafia.  The introduction  of elastic labor supply would
strengthen  our conclusion  about  bifurcation  of economies,  because a government  offering
an unattractive  combination  of taxes and public goods would  see its tax  base further
eroded by the  withdrawal  of labor supply.  The introduction  of elastic  labor supply would
also strengthen  our predictions  concerning  growth,  since bad combinations  of taxes and
public goods now  lead not only to the reallocation  of labor between  the official  and
unofficial  economy,  but to a first  order reduction  in output,  as labor supply is reduced.
8IV.  The Data.
In our empirical work, we try to obtain empirical estimates  of t, Tand Q, as well as
of the size of the official and unofficial sector (U).  Then we examine  the relationship
between t, T and Q, on the one hand, and the size of the unofficial sector U, on the other.
We also examine  the validity of the public finance mechanisms  operating in our model; that
is, the relationship  between the tax, bribery and regulatory burden (t), the budgetary
revenues  (7), and the supply of public goods (Q).
We examine  whether these propositions hold in a broad set of countries for which
there exist at least roughly comparable  estimates of the unofficial economy in the 1  990s.
We have measures  for the unofficial economy for 49 countries in three regions  of the
world: Latin America, the OECD,  and the former Soviet bloc, including Eastern  Europe. The
available  work on the unofficial economy from different parts of the world draws from
studies utilizing different  methodologies  for each region,  yet the estimates appear  to be
comparable. We thus proceed  with the appropriate  cautionary caveats. The sample for our
OLS regressions  varies between 34 and 49 countries, depending  on the coverage  of right-
hand side variables. We have not found comparable  data for the unofficial economy in East
Asia or for Africa, so these countries are excluded  from our empirical investigation.
We use independent  variables measuring  regulation, taxation, rule of law, and
corruption, some based on business  surveys  and others on expert evaluations. On average,
richer countries exhibit relatively low levels of regulatory interventions and also a relatively
small unofficial economy.  This may be because  industrialized  countries have less
regulatory  interventions, are better able to operate a regulatory system without causing  a
measurable  "regulatory burden' on enterprises,  or operate complex regulatory systems
without allowing the discretionary application of regulations  which often results in corrupt
practices. We therefore control for income level in correlating the size  of the unofficial
economy with policy variables, a control which also serves as proxy to capture other
omitted variables relating to the country's overall development  stage.
Measures  of the Unofficial  Economy (U)
The "unofficial economy" constitutes such activity that is not reported  to the state
statistical office.  It may differ from the unrecorded  economy  in official statistics, however,
since central statistical offices often make  some adjustments  to account for these
underreported  activities in the unofficial economy.  The set of economies  for which we
can obtain data comprises  49 countries of Latin America, the OECD,  and the post-
communist countries of Eastern  Europe  and the former Soviet Union (excluding  the former
Yugoslavia, Albania, and a few in the former Soviet Union  and Latin America, for which
there is very little data).
Our data sources differ for the three regions. Data on Eastern  Europe  and the
former Soviet Union are from JKS (1997).  Estimates  were based  on the evolution of total
electricity consumption to compare  total output growth and unofficial activity across
countries.  Electricity consumption offers a rough measure  of overall economic  activity;
around  the world, the short-run electricity-to-GDP  elasticity is usually close to one.
9Measured  GDP  by definition captures only the official part of the economy, so the
difference between overall and measured  GDP  gives an estimate of the size of the
unofficial economy.  In JKS (1997) further adjustments are made to allow for differences in
the elasticity of demand  across countries. For Latin America, estimates of the unofficial
economy's share in GDP  come from Loayza  (1996), who uses the MIMIC (Multiple-
Indicator Multiple Cause)  approach  to estimate  the unofficial economy size. This statistical
method infers the size  of the unofficial economy from a variety of economic  variables."
Finally, estimates of the unofficial economy share for OECD  countries were obtained
primarily from two sources: F. Schneider  (1997), and C. Williams and J. Windebank
(1995).12  Both sources  base their estimates  on studies that  assume the use of cash is
correlated  with unofficial activities. 1 3
Measures  of Policy  (t) and provision of Public Goods  (Q)
As measures  of policy we use, first, index ratings published  by four organizations:
the Fraser  Institute, the Heritage  Foundation,  Freedom  House, and Political Risk Services
(ICRG). These  evaluations are primarily based  on expert opinions and published  statistics.
Second, we also use results from surveys conducted by the World Economic  Forum's
Global  Competitiveness  Survey, Transparency  International,  and Impulse magazine  in
Germany.
Here we briefly review the methodology of each source and country coverage. In
most cases  we are not able to get the full 49 country coverage  of the unofficial economy
estimates  for the possible correlate variables,  although the vast majority of the countries
are normally covered, and the minimum is 34.  We also explain what each index measures.
The numerical  results for each are discussed  in more detail when we present the regression
results, and substantial detail on each variable is provided in Table 1 below as well.
Further, Table Al  in the Appendix presents  much of the data.
"' As right-hand variables, Loayza uses the highest statutory corporate income tax in the country, Rama's index of government
imposed restrictions on labor markets, and a composite average of Political Risk Services' indices for the quality of the
bureaucracy, corruption in government, and rule of law. The proxy variables serving as indicators of the unofficial economy
itself (left hand side variables in Loayza's  model) are the rate of value-added tax evasion (C. Silvani and J. Grondolo 1993) and
the percentage of the nonagricultural labor force which does not contribute to social security (World Bank 1995). Given that our
analysis will regress the unofficial economy on a few similar variables, selected data on Latin America needs to be interpreted
with caution.
12 Williams and Windebank use data from Dallago (1990) and European Community. Schneider (1997) uses the "currency-
demand approach," which assumes shadow transactions take place in the form of cash. The paper reports results from several
authors, and when the data was not available for 1990 (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA) Schneider offers his own calculations.  When a range was offered we took the
average value.
1  More specifically for OECD countries:  For Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands we used the
simple average from the Schneider (1997) and Williams and Windebank (1991).  For Canada and Japan the only estimates we
could find were from Bruce Bartlett (1990).  For Greece and the United Kingdom, our data are the average of the estimates by
Bartlett (1990) and Williams and Windebank (1991).  For Norway and Sweden we averaged estimates by Bartlett (1  990) and
Schneider (1997).  For the United States we averaged Bartlett (1990), Schneider (1997), and the estimate by Richard J. Cebula
(1  997).'  For three countries there was only one available estimate: Portugal (Williams and Windebank (1991)), Switzerland
(Schneider (1997)), and Austria (Schneider (1997)).  Most of these estimates are for the early 1  990s.
10The Fraser  Institute has measured  dimensions  of 'Economic  Freedom"  at five-year
intervals since 1975 for all the countries for our sample (for which estimates of the
unofficial economy exists), except for some in the former Soviet Union (Gwarney and
Lawson 1997).  We use relevant variables from their data series for 1  995.1'4 Their
Freedom  to Compete  index measures  whether the policy environment  allows businesses  to
compete in the marketplace.  The taxation variable measures  the top marginal income tax
rate and the income threshold at which it applies;  Ukraine  is the only sample country not
included  for such variable.  Fraser  Institute also rates separately  the average  tax rate on
international  trade; the sample  size is 39 because  Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Honduras  are not covered.  The legal  framework is rated through their index of the
equality of citizens under  the law and access  to a nondiscriminatory  judiciary.
The Heritage Foundation  surveys  economic freedom every year.  We use  their
ratings from the 1997 Index of Economic  Freedom  (Bryan  Johnson and T. Sheehy), which
measures  the situation in 1996.  For each measure,  Heritage  Foundation  evaluates  all the
countries in our core sample, except Kazakhstan  and Uzbekistan,  so our sample size using
these measures  is 47.  A number  of Heritage  Foundation  indices are relevant for our study.
"Regulation" measures  whether a license  is required  to operate  a business  and how easy it
is to obtain such a license.
It also measures  whether there is corruption within the bureaucracy. "Trade Policy"
measures  the extent to which a government  "hinders the free flow of commerce" using
tariff and non-tariff barriers.  "Taxation" measures  average  taxes on corporate profits and
income.  "Property Rights" measures  the protection of private property against  the
government  and all forms of expropriation.
Political  Risk Services' International Country Risk  Guide (ICRG)  has data for 39 of
the countries in our sample (Political  Risk Services,  no date).  It does not cover 10 post-
communist countries. We use two indices from ICRG's  Political Risk Services:  their "law
and order" index and "corruption" index.  Both measures  are based on expert opinions,
primarily  obtained from qualitative data.
The Global Competitiveness  Survey (GCS)  is a questionnaire  answered by about
2800 managers  in 59 countries during 1996-97 (GCS  of the World Economic  Forum
1997).'5 The respondents are local firms serving domestic market, local firms exporting
and investing abroad, and foreign firms which have made direct investment in that country.
Each  question asks about one aspect of the business  environment and respondents  provide
a rating of the country on a scale of 1 (poorest rating) to 7 (perfect rating).  We use data
from eight different questions on tax burden  as reported by the firm, regulatory burden,
government  intervention in the enterprise  sector, regulatory  discretion and enforcement,
extent of bribery payments" 6, police effectiveness, and labor regulations such as flexibility
14 Unless  otherwise  noted,  the Fraser  Institute  provides  data  on 43 of the 49 countries  in our basic  sample. The  countries  not
covered  are in the former  Soviet  Union:  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Moldova,  and Uzbekistan.
15 This survey  is used by the World  Economic  Forum  of Davos  and the Harvard  Institute  for International  Development  in their
Global  Competitiveness  Report.
1  The  question  to firms  was: how common  are "irregular,  additional  payments  connected  with  import  and export  permits,
business  licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax assessments,  police  protection  or loan applications."
11in hiring and firing, in number of hours employees  can work and minimum wage
regulations.  The GCS  variables include data for 34 countries in our sample, and excludes
1  1 transition economies as well as Bolivia, Ecuador,  Panama,  and Paraguay.
J. Lambsdorff of Transparency  International (TI) reports on an extended TI index
which summarizes  the results of a maximum of seven survey-based  sources per country, of
which we use one directly (as described  above): ICRG's  Political Risk Services.  The
extended  TI corruption index by Lambsdorff covers 43 countries, excluding very few in our
sample. The 1997 index uses  data from 1996 and 1997.
One further measure  of bribery is a survey of German  business  people conducted in
1992-94 by Peter Neumann  at Impulse (a German  business  publication). Respondents
were typically exporters conducting frequent business  at least one of 103 countries.  We
use responses  to the question about the prevalence  of bribes in securing contracts for a
particular  country.  On average  10 people were interviewed for each country, with a
minimum of 3 exporters per country.  Of our core sample,  this source has data on all the
countries except Moldova and Panama.
12TABLE 1-VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION
UNOFFICIAL  ECONOMY
,  .......... ~~~~~~.  . .. ...............  .........  ..........  ....................... ......  .. .....  ...  ..........  .............  ....  ...  .......................................  .......  ...  ...  ..................  ...................................
Name  Source  Years  Notes
iUnofficial  Economy  Johnson,  Kaufmann,  Zoido-  j1990s  See  description  on  data  section.  Basic  original  sources:  Latin  America,  Loayza,  Transition  Economies,  Johnson,
as  a % of GDP  Lobaton.  K  aufmann  and  Shleifer,  and  OECD,  Schneider.
............~~~~~~~~~~~.  .....  ....  ...................  .......  .........  ..................  ............  .........  .....  ................................................  ... .........  ......  ...........  .........  ..........................  ................  ..  . ..  . . ....................  .....................
TAXATION
i.  . . . ..  ..  ...  ...  ..  ..............  ..  ..................  ..  ..  . ...  ..  ..  ..  . .................-  1.  ................................  ..........  ......................  . . ..................  ............  ...  ...  . ......  ......  ..  ..
Name  'Source  ;  Years  iNotes
...... ..........  ............  ......_  ...._  .. .. I ,  I . . ......  .........  .__  ...  ..  .......  ..  .."  .................  ..  .I...  ............  ..  ..  ......  ...............  .........  ........  ...  ..""  ...  .....  .
.Average  Corporate Heritage  Foundation,  Index  of  1997  :Average  of income  taxes  and  corporate  taxes,  adjusted  for other  taxes  such  as  value  added  taxes,  sales  taxes,  and
;and Income  Tax  'Economic  Freedom  1997.  state  and  local  taxes.  As  for the income  taxes  both  the top income  tax rate  as  rate  that applies  to the average
lRate  Index  lWashington,  D.C.,  1997.  (taxpayer  tax  rate  applicable  to GDP  per  capita  were  analyzed.  Low  taxes  (below  10%)  means  a better  score  (1, a
lower  score  means  more  freedom).  Note  that a higher  value  means  less  free  (1-5).
What  is  the  top income  tax rate?
What  tax  rate  applies  to the  average  income  level?
j  What  is  the  top corporate  tax  rate?
i  What  other  tax exist?
.. . ................. i...  ........  ... ....  ..  ............  .. ...  .......................  ...  ......  ...............................  ....  ................-  . ...  ......................  .....................  ...........  .....  ...  ... ....  .. ..........  .... ....... ... ...................................  ...... 
'Top Marginal  'Fraser  Institute,  Economic  1995 iThe  lower  the  top marginal  income  tax  rate  (for a  corresponding  income  threshold)  the  higher  the  score. Note  that
!Income  Tax  Rate  'Freedom  of the World  1997.  a higher  score  means  more  freedom,  scores  go from  (1-10).
(and  income  'Washington,  D.C.,  1997.  Original  sources:  Price  Waterhouse,  Individual  Taxes:  A Worldwide  Summary.
threshold  at which  it!
a  p  p  )  ...  . . .....  ...............  i  ..........  ................  ......  . . ... . ... ..........  j.L.
Taxes  on  iFraser  Institute,  Economic  1995 iRevenue  from  taxes  on international  trade  transactions  Table  A, line  6 divided  by exports  plus  imports,  the score  is
International  Trade  Freedom  of the World  1997.  !  higher  the lower  the percentage.  Note  that a higher  score  means  more  freedom,  scores  go from  (1-10).
;as a Percent  of  .Washington,  D.C.,  1997  ':Original  sources:  IMF,  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  for tax  revenue,  and  International  Financial
jExports  Plus  Imports  !  ,Statistics  from  exports  and  imports. .......  ....  .................  -.  .....  ......  .4  --- ---  .....  ... ...........  ...  ...  .......  ........  .. ......-  - -'  - ---- 1---  ---
.Tariff  and  Non-Tariff  Heritage  Foundation,  Index  of  .1997  Measures  the degree  to which  a government  hinders  the  free  flow of foreign  commerce.  The  lowest  (highest)
Trade  Barriers  lEconomic  Freedom  1997.  i  score  goes  to countries  with less  (more)  than  4% (20%)  average  tariff rates  or very  low (high)  non  tariff barriers.
:Washington,  D.C.,  1997.  Note  that  a higher  value  means  less  free  (1-5).
*  What  is the  average  tariff rate?
*  Are  there  any  significant  non-tariff  barriers?
*  Is  there  corruption  in the  customs  service?
Original  sources:  Sources  of the  average  tariff rate: GATT  and  IMF,  ratio  of tariffs  and  duties  revenue  to total
imports  when  not  available  or US  trade  representative's  office,  Commerce  Department  and  State  Department
publications.  If non-tariff  barriers  were  significant,  according  to the  authors,  scores  were  moved  up by one  point. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .......  ....  ........................  ...........  ....  . ..  ..  ;.......  ..........  .........  ...  . ....  ................  ..  ..  . ..  ..  . . . ....  ..  ........  ......................  ........................  ................  ......  ....  ........  ...
:Tax  Burden  World  Economic  Forum  (WEF)  1997 Executives'  responses  to the  question:  "The  tax system  in your  country  hinders  (enhances)  business
Reported  by  the  Global  Competitiveness  Survey  competitiveness."(v2  10) Evaluations  range  from 1 to 7, were  a higher  value  means  a better  score  for private
Firm  1997  (GCS97),  Geneva,  1997.  business.
GOVERNMENT  REVENUES
. ....  ....  ....  ....  ....  ..............  ....................  . ...  .........  .............................................................................  . ..............  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ ;.......................................
Name  Source  Years  Notes
Total  Government  'International  Monetary  Fund  1992-  Total  Government  Revenues  as  a %  of GDP.  data  from  the World  Development  Indicators.  International  Monetary
Revenues  as  % GDP  (IMF)  and  World  Bank  (WB).  1995 Fund  (IMF)  World  Economic  Outlook  database,  World  Bank  (WB),  World  Development  Indicators  1997  CD-ROM
Ifor Venezuela),  and  WB  MultiQuery  for Cross  Country  Comparisons  Europe  and  Central  Asia  Department  II. (for
-Czech  Republic  and  Slovak  Republic).
..............  .................................................  .............................  .. . .... ............  ........  ....  ...  . ... .............  . .............  .............  . .........  ............  . ...  ...........  ..  .........REGULATION
Name  _  l~~~~~~~~~~~~Source  Years No  tes
;Regulatory  Burden  ~Kaufmann  and  Sachs,  197Executives'  responses  to the  question:  "Government  regulations  impose  (do  not impose)a  heavy  burden  on
'Reported  by  the  "Determinants  of Corruption",  ibusiness  competitiveness."  (v2.02).  Note  that a higher  score  means  less  regulatory  burden 11-71.
'Firm  'forthcoming  1998,  original
source  GCS97.
lGovernment  Kaufmann  and  Sachs,  11997  !Executives'  responses  to the question:  "Excepting  the  state-controlled  sector,  state  interference  in private  business'
Inefrneon  "'Determinants  of Corruption",  is  pervasive  (minimal)."  (v2.04). Note  that  a higher  score  means  less  interference  11-7).
'Firms  forthcoming  1  998,  original
isource  GCS97.
lRegulatory  jKaufmann  and  Sachs,  97Eeuie'rsosst  h  usin  Gvrmn  euain  r  au  n  a  (precise  and  fully  enforce)."
Enforcement  ~~~~"Determinants  of Corruption",  (v2.08). Note  that a  higher  score  means  less  discretion  (1-7).
Iforthcoming  1  998,  original
:source  GCS97.
!Regulations  iHeritage  Foundation,  Index  of  197Countries with lower  (higher)  scores  fulfill more(less)  of the following  conditions  that they  met. Note  that a higher
iEconomic  Freedom  1997.  ivalue  means  less  free  (1-5).
iWashington,  D.C.,  1997.  iIs  a license  required  to operate  a business?  Is it easy  to obtain?
Is there  corruption  within  the bureaucracy?
Does  the  government  force  businesses  to subscribe  to established  work  weeks  , paid  vacations,  maternity
.. ,...  ~~~~~~~~~~~~leave,  etc.?-
lFreedom  of Private ;Kaufmann  and  Sachs,  I1995§  rethr  free  businesses  or cooperatives?
jBusinesses  and  "'Determinants  of Corruption",  O  1riginal sources:  Freedom  House,  Survey  of Political  Rights  and  Civil  Liberties  1995-96,  item  9 on  their  check  list
Cooperatives  to  'forthcoming  1998,  original  !of 13 civil  liberties,  with  some  adjustments.
:Compete  in Markets  :source  GCS97.  - ~  Note_that_a  higher  score  means  more  freedom,  scores  go from  (1-1  0).
,Minimum  Wage  World  Economic  Forum,  1997 !Executives'  responses  to the  question:  "Minimum  wage  regulations  are  a barrier  to (do  not significantly  increase 
Regulations ~~~Executive  Survey.  Global  !the costs  of)I  hiring  unskilled  or  young  workers."  1v7.08).  Note  that a higher  score  means  less  regulation  11-7).
lCompetitiveness  Report  1997
:(GCS97).  Geneva,  1997.
!Hiring  and  Firing  Wrld Economic  Forum,  1997 :Executives'  responses  to the  question:  "Hiring  and  firing  practices  are  severely  restricted  by government  (are
Regulations  Executive  Survey.  Global  iflexibly  determined  by  employers."  1v7.09).  Note  that a higher  score  means  less  regulation  (1-7).
CometiiveessReport  1997
(9S7.Geneva,  1997.
iFlexible  Number  of  WrdEconomic  Forum,  :1997 'Executives'  responses  to  the question:  "Labor  regulations  impede  (facilitate)  the  adjustment  of working  hours  to
iHours  Executive  Survey.  Global  :meet unexpected  changes  in demand."  (v7.10l. Note  that a higher  score  means  less  regulation  11-71.
Competitiveness  Report  1997
'(GCS97).  Geneva,  1997.
LEGAL  INSTITUTIONS  AND  CORRUPTION
'Namne  Source  Years :Notes
'Rule  of Law  iCoplin  and  O'Leary,  Handbook  of'1990-  "'A  country  with an established  law and  order  tradition  (high  score)  has  sound  political  institutions,  a strong  court
Country  and  Political  Risk  197sse,and  provisions  for an  orderly  succession  of power. This  indicator  reflects  the  degree  to which  the citizens
Analysis,  Political  Risk  Services,  of a country  are  willing  to accept  the established  institutions  to make  and  implement  laws  and  adjudicate
;East  Syracuse,  New  York,  1994.  'disputes." Note  that a higher  score  means  stronger  tradition  10-6).  The  average  for 1  999 to 1  997 was  used.'Property  rights  HeiaeFoundation,  Index  of  :1997  -A  lower  (higher)  score  represents  private  property  more  (less)  guaranteed.  Note  that a higher  value  means  less
EcnmcFreedom  1997.  free  (1-5).
:Washington,  D.C.,  1997.  Is the legal  system  free  form  government  influence?
. Is there  a commercial  code  defining  contracts?
* Does  the  country  allow  foreign  arbitration  of contract  disputes?
* Can  property  be  expropriated  by  the government?
* Is  there  corruption  within  the  judiciary?
* Are  there  major  delays  in receiving  judicial  decisions?
a  Is  private  property  legally  granted  and  protected?
1Equality  of Citizens FrsrInstitute, Economic  I1990, :*  Are  citizens  equal  under  the  law, with access  to an independent,  nondiscriminatory  judiciary  and  are  they
:Under  the  Law  and lFreedom  of the World  1997.  195  respected  by the security  forces?
!Access  of Citizens iWashington,  D.C.,  1  997.  Original  sources:  Freedom  House,  Survey  of Political  Rights  and  Civil  Liberties  1995-96  item  5 on  their  check  list o
,to a Non-  13 civil  liberties,  with some  adjustments.
'discriminatory  Note  that a higher  score  means  more  freedom,  scores  go from (1-10).
'Police  Effectiv-e  n,e,ss  World  Economic  Forum,  '1997  'Executives'  responses  to the question:  "The  police  in your  country  do not (do)  effectively  safegard  personal
'Executive  Survey.  Global  Isecurity  so  that  it is  not an  important  consideration  in business  activity."  1v7.1O0).  Note  that a higher  score  means
:Competitiveness  Report  1997  !less  regulation  (1-7).
.............................  .................  ............... G.C.........S9  7......)......  . ..........  .......... Gen  ev  a,...  .. ........  ..........  ...  ..........  1  9  9  7  ..  ..  .........................
'Bureaucratic  Quality  ;Coplin  and  O'Leary,  Handbook  of  11  990<  A high  quality  bureaucracy  is characterized  by its strength  and  expertise  to government  without  drastic  changes  in
Country  and  Political  Risk  .1997  poiyor  interruptions  in government  services.  In  other  words,  in countries  with a high  quality  bureaucracy  a
iAnalysis.  Political  Risk  Services,  !change  in government  will not lead  to traumatic  changes  in terms  of policy  formulation  and  day-to-day
'East Syracuse,  New  York,  1  994.  administrative  functions.  A high  quality  bureaucracy  is  also  somewhat  autonomous  from  political  pressure  and  has:
:an  established  mechanism  for recruitment  and  training.  Note  that a higher  score  means  better  quality  (O-61.The
ivariable  used  in our  analysis  is the  average  index  from 1990  to 1  997
!ICRG  Corruption  'Coplin  and  O'Leary,  Handbook  of;i  1990 "'A  highest  rating  tend  to signify  a  democratic  country  whose  government  has  been  in office  for less  than  five
Index  'Country  and  Political  Risk  'years, and  where  government  officials  do not often  seek  special  payments.  The  lowest  ratings  are  given  to
'Analysis,  Political  Risk  Services,  icountries  that  usually  are  non-democratic,  where  the government  has  been  in power  for more  .than  1  0 years,  high
East  Syracuse,  New  York,  1994.  1government  officials  are  likely  to demand  special  payments,  and  illegal  payments  are  generally  accepted  throughout
'the society"  A Business  Guide  to Political  Risk,  PRS  Chapter  8 Forecasting--The  ICRG  Way. Note  that a higher
score  means  less  corrupt  (0-6).  The  average  for 1  990  to  .1997  was  used.
:Transparency  :Johan G.  Lambsdorff,  .1997  Note  that  a higher  score  means  more  free  (0-1  01.  Countries  included  in this  index  which  are  excluded  from  the
International  "'Corruption  Perception  Around  officially  published  TI index  are  subject  to less  reliability  in estimated  corruption  perception  index,  the outcome  of
:Corruption  Index  the  World",  draft paper  less  number  of surveys  the composite  estimate  is based  on.
(extended)  presented  at  the AICC  Lima;
1997.
Glo-bal  'World  Economic  Forum,  197Executives' responses  to the question:  "Irregular,  additional  payments  connected  with import  and  export  permits,
Competiiveness  Executiv  Suvy'lblbusiness  licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax  assessments,  police  protection  or  loan  applications  are  common  Ill  - not
SuvyBribery  Index:Competitiveness  Report  1997.  co  mo(7." (v8.03).
'Impulse  Exporter  iPeter Neumann  "B6se:  Fast  Alle !ca.  lIncidence  of bribery  in public  sector  in foreign  country  as  reported  based  by German  traders  and  investors  abroad.
:Bribery  Index  iBestechen",  Impulse  Jan.  4,  .19
:1994.
'Growth  World  Bank,  World  Development  196-GNP per  capita  average  annual  growth  rate  (from  1986  to 1  993  for all countries,  except  transition  economies  for
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In order to make it easier  to check our results, we have kept the original signs on
variables. The reader should  exercise care because  organizations' ratings differ in whether
a high numerical  value corresponds  to "better" policies for business  and private investment
(i.e., lower regulations  or taxation) or "worse" policies for business. To help understand
the scaling  for each variable, in addition to the regression  results we report individual
highest and lowest scores in our sample, as well as the ratings for Russia  and Brazil (as
comparators)  as well as the numbers  for particularly noteworthy individual cases. Further,
in the regression  tables we indicate which direction the particular index needs  to be
interpreted. Regression  results are presented  in tables 2 to 7, included at the end of the
paper, and in the plot figures immediately  thereafter.
Taxation  and the Unofficial  Economy
We explore empirically the relationship  between various variables of the tax regime
as well as at government  revenues  as a percent of GDP. Within the tax regime we look at
tax rates and tax burden. In all we have six measures  from five independent  sources.
For transition economies,  utilizing indices available  for that region only, JKS find
that higher  tax burden  is associated  with a higher unofficial economy share. Loayza
similarly models and analyzes  the unofficial economy for Latin America.  Consequently,  a
priori we would have expected  to find corroboration of such relationship  for our broader
combined  country sample. However, some of our results appear  surprising at first.
In the Heritage  Foundation  measure  of average  corporate and income tax rates, a
higher  score (on a scale of 1-5) means more onerous  taxation, i.e., higher average  and
marginal  tax rates.  Perhaps  surprisingly for this kind of cross-country measure  based on
expert assessments,  OECD  countries typically have a score  that is higher  than that for
transition economies  and for Latin America.  For example, the US scores 3.5, UK scores  4,
and ltaly scores 5, while among the transition economies  Georgia  scores 2.5, Russia  scores
3.5, and Ukraine  scores 4.5 and in Latin America, Brazil  scores 2.5 and Argentina scores
3.5.  In other words, according  to this measure  the US has higher marginal and average  tax
rates than does Russia. The regression  results in table 2  shows that this measure  of
taxation is significant with and without controlling for log GDP;  however, higher  taxation is
correlated  with a lower  share of the unofficial economy. Raising  taxation by one point,
according  to this measure,  implies  that the share of the unofficial economy falls by 11.8
percent. Controlling  for log GDP  per capita reduces  the effect to 5.3 percent, but the
coefficient is still significant.
The Fraser  Institute measure  of top marginal income rates is higher for countries
that have lower tax rates, on a scale of 1-10.  Again, the "best" tax rates are in seemingly
unlikely places: Bolivia and Uruguay  both score a perfect 10.17 The worst (i.e., highest) tax
rates are in Italy, Belgium,  Sweden, Denmark,  and Romania,  all of which score the lowest
attainable value of 1.  The US scores 7, the UK scores 5, while Russia  and Brazil  both
score 8. Chile scores 4, which is the best in Latin America. Table 2 shows that a one-point
17  Bolivia's recent  tax reform  is presumably  reflected  in this rating.
16increase  in this index (i.e. a  lowering in tax rates) is associated  with a 3.5 percentage
point increase  in the share of the unofficial economy (see also figure 1).  Controlling  for log
GDP  per capita reduces  the coefficient on this index to  1.9, but it remains  significant,
therefore the "wealthy"  country effect alone  does not account for the bulk of this
surprising result.
The Fraser  Institute's measure  of taxes on international  trade is higher when these
taxes are lower, again on a scale of 1-10.  Outside  the OECD,  the best scores are in
Panama  for Latin America, and in the Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Lithuania, and Latvia for
transition economies. The lowest scores  in our sample  are in Russia,  which earns a 2, and
Poland,  which earns a 4.18 A one-point improvement  in this index reduces  the share of the
unofficial economy by 3.7 percentage  points (see  Table 2).  But the observations are highly
clustered between 6 and 10 and controlling for income makes  the international  trade tax
variable insignificant.
The Heritage  Foundation  offers an index of the tariff and non-tariff barriers  to trade,
and as such partially captures international  trade taxation (and the rest trade regulations).
This index is higher when there are more restrictions i.e., when trade is less free.  The
highest score of 5 is awarded to Azerbaijan,  Russia,  and Belarus; Brazil scores  a 4.  The
best score of 1 is awarded solely to the Czech Republic,  while the US earns a 2.  Table 2
shows that a one-point increase  in this index is associated  with an 8.9 percent increase  in
the unofficial economy (see also Figure 2).  Controlling for log GDP  per capita reduces  this
to a 3.6 percent increase  which is significant  at the 10 percent level.
The above four indices on taxation therefore provide  mixed results: the two income
and corporate  taxes are negatively related to the unofficial economy, while international
trade taxes are positively related to it (although less significantly). The fifth index at our
disposal,  namely the tax burden rating, as reported by the firms themselves in the GCS,
provides  additional complexity:  the higher  the index rating from 1 (worse tax burden) to 7
(best), the lower the unofficial economy share. The highest score goes for the UK, 4.60,
and the US scores 3.43, while Ukraine  holds the worst score, 1.59, and in Latin America
Brazil scores 2.22.  Here the results are highly significant even after controlling for GDP  per
capita (table 2, and figure 3).  Overall, considering  the results of the various tax variables,
it appears  that there is a substantial difference between the impact of different types of
taxes on the unofficial economy (trade versus other taxes), and between statutory tax
rates, on the one hand, and tax burden on the firm, on the other.  The latter distinction
suggests that institutional issues of tax administration may matter at least as much as tax
regime  issues relating to tax rates. We will return to this issue. Yet let us note now that
while the adverse "price" effect of higher  official tax rates and eventual  tax burden
provides  an incentive to move to the unofficial economy, our public finance model also
includes  the compensating  effect of higher revenues  resulting in better provision of public
goods for the official sector-assuming  that the revenue  curve is not in the "Laffer" range.
Thus, it is pertinent to test what the unofficial economy  empirical response  function
to higher revenue  generation  is.  The last row in table 2 reports the results on revenues.
Using the standard IMF and World Bank  data on revenue  as a percent of GDP
indicates  tax revenue  being  around 50% of GDP in Hungary,  the Czech Republic,  and
18 It appears  likely  that  this rating for Poland  is out of date.
17Slovakia;  in contrast with Guatemala  and Georgia  where it is less than 10%.  Brazil  has
revenues  around 16 percent of GDP  while Russia  is around  26 percent of GDP. 1 9 Table 2
(and figure 4)  shows that a one-percent  increase  in tax revenue  (as a share of GDP)  is
associated  with a 0.7 percentage  point fall in the unofficial economy (as a share of GDP).
Controlling  for income per capita reduces  the coefficient to 0.5 but it remains significant at
the 5 percent level.  Thus, as predicted  by our model, countries with a higher share of tax
revenues  in GDP  actually have a lower share of the unofficial economy. 20
Regulation  and the Unofficial Economy
For regulation we have five different measures  produced by three independent
organizations  measuring  overall regulations  on enterprise,  and three measures  from the
same  source for labor regulations.
The Global Competitiveness  Survey's measures  of regulatory burden, government
intervention and regulatory enforcement  are higher, on a scale of 1 to 7, when regulations
are considered  "better" for business.  For instance, the variable measuring regulatory
enforcement/discretion  from the GCS  has a separate  measure  of regulatory
enforcement/discretion,  and, as the others in the GCS,  is on a scale of 1 to 7.  Russia  and
Ukraine  have the lowest score in our sample  with 2.0; Brazil rates better with 3.5, and
most of the OECD  countries score 4.5 or higher--Switzerland  has the highest score with
5.6 in our sample (Singapore  had the highest score worldwide in the survey, with 6.4).
Table 3 shows that a one point higher  score in this index is correlated with a 9-percentage
point fall in the share of the unofficial economy (figure 4).  However, this measure  is not
significant once we control for log GDP  per capita.  But as seen in Table 3 the other two
GCS regulatory  variables are significant in both specifications. When either of these two
regulatory measures  is one point better, the share of the unofficial economy is about 8
percentage  points lower.  When we control for the log of GDP  per capita, this effect of
one point improvement in the regulatory indices are lowered to 4-to-5 percentage points
decline in the unofficial economy, yet they are still highly significant.
The Heritage  Foundation's  measure  of regulation is higher, on a scale of 1 to 5, for
countries that have regulations  that are worse for business. The Czech Republic  actually
has the best score - it is the only country in our sample  to get a perfect 1.  Most OECD
countries score 2.  Russia  and Ukraine  score 4 (out of a possible 5), while Brazil scores 3.
Table 3 shows that a one-point increase  in this index is associated  with a 14.7 percentage
point increase  in the share of the unofficial economy. Controlling  for log GDP  per capita
reduces  the coefficient on the regulation  variable, to 8.1, but it remains significant.
The Fraser  Institute's measure  of the freedom to compete in 1995 is also higher
when there is "more" economic freedom, i.e., greater freedom to compete  (less regulatory
barriers  to entry).  In this index Russia  and Ukraine  have the lowest score of 5, along with
only Guatemala  and Romania. The highest score of 10 is awarded to some OECD
19 An important  caveat  is that we have not been  able  to obtain  accurate  data on regional,  local, and off-budget  spending.  This
can affect  comparisons  for some countries. For example,  Russia's general  government  spending  is actually  40 percent  of GDP,
compared  with  central  government  spending  of around 15  percent.
20 Taking into  account  the unofficial  economy  fully  would  raise  measured  GDP  and make  the estimated  relationship  here even
stronger.
18countries,  along with  the  Czech Republic, Hungary, and Argentina.  The  remaining
countries  are scored as 7.5.21  Table 3 shows that  a one point increase in this  index is
associated with  a 4.7  percentage point drop in the share of the  unofficial  economy,  while
controlling  for  log GDP per capita  reduces the coefficient  to 2.3  percent  (and significant
only at the  10 percent  level).
In summary,  we find  strong  evidence that  less regulation  (i.e., a regulatory  regime
that  is more business friendly  and presumably represents less political  control  rights)  is
correlated with  a lower  share of the unofficial  economy.  However,  countries  with  a higher
income level also have a lower  level of the unofficial  economy,  so when we control  for
income level the  regulation  variable has a lower coefficient  and it loses some significance.
Yet even after controlling  for GDP per capita the evidence of the adverse impact  on the
unofficial  economy  of overall  regulations on enterprise is still clearer than  the much weaker
results for labor regulations:  as seen in the  last three rows  in table 3, not a single
regression gave a significant  result for any of the  labor regulation variables.  While this
result requires further  validation  through  additional  tests  with  independent  indices of  labor
regulations,  if confirmed  it would  challenge a significant  strand of the literature  on the
informal  sector (Tokman,  Todaro, Lubell, Loayza, others) positing  that  labor regulations is
central  to  understand the dynamics  of the unofficial  sector.  Indeed, the  vast development
literature  on the  "informal  sector"  takes a predominantly  labor market  approach to  its
analysis and measurement.  We find  suggestive  evidence here that  the  explicit  and implicit
taxation  of  factors  of production  other than  labor may matter  at least as much, if  not
more, in the firm's  decision-making  function  on mobility  between  official  and unofficial
activities.  This, in turn,  hints at the  importance  of also understanding  the  unofficial
economy  from  a public  finance  rather than from  a pure labor market  perspective.
However,  it  would  also be  insufficient  to analyze the  unofficial  economy from the
narrow  (public finance)  perspective  of measuring taxes  and regulations only.  Next we
delve deeper into  key institutional  aspects of the  public finance  nexus.
Q effect  on U:  Rule of Law, Bureaucracy,  Corruption and the Unofficial  Economy
In our framework  the  overall quality of the legal environment  is the key public good
that  can be made exclusive to  official  activities;  as such it is a key measure of  Q.
Similarly,  official  activities  will  benefit  more specifically  from effective  protection  of
property  rights,  an effective  police, and the facilitation  and pro-market  services  provided by
a high quality government  bureaucracy.  These are also clear measures of  Q in our model,
for which  there are empirical  indices.  Finally, and centrally  in our framework,  we test  the
relationship between  various  measures of corruption  and bribery  and the  unofficial
economy.  Bribery, as a privately  pocketed tax,  can be still thought  as a measure more
closely  capturing  t  --  while  corruption  more generally  mirrors both  t and Q, since it
encompasses both the  "tax"  payments  as well as the overall institutional  failure  in the
public sector  associated with  a corrupt  administration.  We  turn to the  results of our
analysis of all these measures against the  share of the  unofficial  economy,  presented in
21 Among Asian countries, Indonesia scores 5, Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea score 7.5, and Hong Kong scores 10. These
ratings relative to the countries in our main sample are quite typical.
19table 4 (and some of them  are depicted  in figures  6 to 9).
There are four  indices which  measure some aspect of  the legal institutional
framework,  one measuring the quality of the bureaucracy,  and four  indices measuring
bribery or corruption  directly.  These nine indices are the  work  of six  separate
organizations.
Political Risk Services'  International  Country  Risk Guide contains  a "rule of  law
index"  which  is higher where the rule of  law is stronger,  on a scale of  0-6.  The US and
several other OECD countries  achieve the  highest level of 6.  In our sample, Colombia  has
the lowest  score of  1.4.  Russia scores 3.5.  Table 4 shows that  a one-point  increase in the
value of this index is associated  with  a 10.6  percentage point fall  in the  share of the
unofficial  economy.  In this case log GDP per capita is not significant  and including this  rule
of law control  variable reduces the  estimated  coefficient  on the index only to  9.3  while  not
affecting  its high statistical  significance.
The Heritage  Foundation's  index of property  rights is lower  where  property  rights
are more secure, on a scale of  1-5.  The only non-OECD country  to  score 1 is Chile. Four
previously  communist  countries  have the worst  score of 4:  Romania, Ukraine, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan.  Russia and Brazil score 3.  Table 4 shows  that  a one-point  increase in this
index is associated  with  a 13.4  percent fall in the  share of the  unofficial  economy.
Controlling  for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient  to  8.0,  but it remains highly
significant.
In the Fraser Institute  measure of  "Equality  of Citizens Under the  Law and Access  of
Citizens to  a Non-Discriminatory  Judiciary,"  a higher score means a "better"  legal system,
on a scale of 0-10.  Only Belgium, Holland, Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark and Switzerland  get
the top  score of  10.  Italy,  UK and USA score 7.5,  while Russia scores 2.5  and some
countries  in South America  receive even lower scores.  Table 4 shows that  a one-point
increase in this index implies  a 3.8  percentage point fall in the unofficial  economy's  share
of total  GDP.  Controlling  for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient  to  2.3 but  it
remains significant.
The GCS survey  has a question to firms  on their  assessment  on the effectiveness  of
the police in fulfilling  their  protective  duties.  Not surprisingly,  the variation  across
countries  is very large, and it is highly and significantly  correlated  with  the  share of the
unofficial  economy:  a one point improvement  in this  index is associated  with  a 5.5-7.3
percent  decline in the  unofficial  economy,  depending whether  GDP per capita  is controlled
for or not (table 4).
Political Risk Services  (ICRG) rates the quality  of the bureaucracy  across  countries
and over time,  in a scale of  1 (worst)  to 6 (best, as in some Nordic countries).  We average
their  ratings during  the nineties,  and find that  the  bureaucratic  quality  index is significantly
associated  with  the  share of the unofficial  economy.  Even after controlling  for GDP per
capita the effect  of a one point improvement  in this  index is almost  an 8 percentage point
reduction  in the size of the  unofficial  economy,  and highly  significant.
The various  measures of bribery and  corruption  also suggest a significant
association  with  the  unofficial  economy.  The corruption  index of ICRG, ranging  between  1
20and 6 (best) and averaged  for the nineties, shows a significant association with the
unofficial economy; the effect of a one point improvement  in the index is about an 8-1  1
percentage  point decline in the unofficial economy, and highly significant in both
specifications (figure 8).  The extended  Transparency  International measure  of corruption,
scaled between 0-10, where a higher  score means  less bribery and corruption, covers 43 of
the countries in our sample. 22 Denmark  has the highest score with 9.94 and in our sample
Bolivia has  the lowest with 2.1 (Nigeria  is lower overall, however, and many other
countries are not covered in this index).  Russia  scores 2.3 while Brazil scores 3.6. The
best Latin American country is Chile with 6.1.  Table 4 shows that a one-point increase  in
the corruption index is associated  with a 5.1 percent point decrease  in the unofficial
economy (figure 9); if controlling for GDP per capita there is still a sizable  and significant
3.5 percentage  point effect.
In the Global Competitiveness  Survey measure  of bribery, a higher score means  less
corruption, scaled 1-7.  Among countries for which we also have data on the unofficial
economy, the highest score is Sweden  with 6.6.  The lowest scores are for several  Central
America countries, which are under 3, as well as Russia  that scores 2.7.  Table 4 shows
that a one point increase  in this index implies  a reduction in the share of the unofficial
economy by 8 percentage  points (without the control variable) and by 3.9 percentage
points (if we control for log GDP  per capita).
In the Impulse index of corruption, a higher score is worse. 23 Russia  and Brazil are
both awarded 4 (one point away from the worst possible score). The highest score of 0 is
awarded to the usual OECD  countries plus Lithuania. Again, Chile is the highest ranked
Latin American country, awarded a score of 1.  As Table 4 shows a one-point increase  in
this index is associated  with a 1.8 percentage  point increase  in the share of the unofficial
economy.  Controlling  for GDP  per capita more than halves the coefficient and makes  it
significant only at the 10% level.
In summary,  the relationship  between share of the unofficial economy and
bureaucratic  quality as well as rule of law (including  corruption) is strong and consistent
across nine measures  provided by six distinct organizations. Countries  with more bribery
and corruption have a higher share of the unofficial economy. This is the case even when
we control for income level.
Having explored in some detail the possible determinants (or at least controlled
correlates)  of the Unofficial economy, we briefly discuss the results of the potential
determinants  of other key variables in our model. Specifically, we consider  first ,whether,
as predicted by our model, various measures  of Q appear  to be associated  with better
government revenue  (T) mobilization. Then we explore  briefly the potential correlates with
government revenues  (determinants  of 7), and finally we ask what may be driving the
measure  of tax burden (t).
22 This  index  requires  that countries  have  had only  2 (rather  than 4) surveys.
23 Among  the 103 countries  surveyed,  the worst score  is awarded  to Bangladesh,  Myanmar  (Burma),  Indonesia,  Iran,  Nigeria,
Pakistan,  the Philippines,  and Thailand.
21T effect on Q:  Does  Government  Revenue  matter  for better  provision  of Q (Public  Goods)?
Table 5 summarizes  the results of regressing  various measures  of Q on government
revenues. All five measures  of these public goods (Q) are positively influenced by higher
revenue  mobilization, and most specifications are significant at the 5% level.  Specifically,
Rule  of law (ICRG),  equality of treatment before the law (Fraser),  and bureaucratic quality
(ICRG)  are highly significantly associated  with government  revenues  even after controlling
for GDP per capita (see  also figures 10 and 1  1).  The more narrowly defined indices of
police effectiveness and protection of property rights are also of the right sign but only
significant when GDP  per capita is not controlled for.  Overall,  the results are supportive
of an association between T and Q, although the customary qualifiers on causality direction
probably apply even more strongly in this case. Thus, at a minimum we suggest that the
evidence  from simple and controlled correlations does not contradict our model's linkage
between higher revenue mobilization  and improved provision of public goods exclusive  to
official activities.
How does t  affect  T  Possible  Determinants  of  Government Revenues.
In the earlier  empirical exploration of the determinants  of the unofficial economy we
observed  that there was a complex and ambiguous  relationship  between various tax rate
measures  and the unofficial economy. Yet Government  Revenues  was negatively and
positively associated  with a lower share of the unofficial economy. To open a possible
"black box", we  consider  the relationship  between government revenues  and various
measures  of  t.  Table 6, as well as figures 1  2-1  5, summarize  the results of possible
determinants  of Government  Revenues.  Consistent with the earlier results of t on U, we
find that higher  corporate and income  tax rates do generate  higher tax revenues,  yet the
opposite  is the case with international  trade taxes, which negatively affect revenues.
Interestingly, the variable measuring  tax burden as reported by the firm is
significantly and negatively associated  with government revenues  if GDP per capita is not
controlled for, and it is totally insignificant once income levels are controlled for.  The
evidence at least suggests, therefore, that higher overall  tax burden on the firm does not
lead  to higher revenue  mobilization. And different types of taxes may have differential
effects on overall revenues;  higher corporate and income  tax rates may help, trade taxes
may not.  Further, the interpretation and application  of such tax rates at the firm level
matters.
By contrast, the effect of a corrupt bureaucracy  is less ambiguous: higher
corruption is associated  with higher revenue  mobilization,  and in three out of four
specifications the results are significant at the 5% level (see  also figure 12).  Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997), using panel  data with one corruption index, also find a highly significant
effect of corruption on revenues.
What determines  t ? :  Possible  determinants  of Tax Burden  on the firm.
Given  the central importance  of overall measures  of  t  in determining  the "mobility"
decision of the firm, in table 7 we consider  possible determinants  of tax burden as reported
by the firm.  Consistent with our findings above,  we observe a very insignificant (and
22ambiguous  sign) relationship between measures  of corporate and income tax rates, on the
one hand, and the measure  of tax burden as reported by the firm, on the other (figure 16).
Yet international  trade taxes (and non-tariff barriers)  are positively and significantly
associated  with the overall  tax burden  on the firm (figure 17).  And the extent of  bribery
and corruption negatively affects the tax burden of enterprises; most specifications
(although  by no means all) are significant at the 5% level (figure 18).
These  findings suggest, first, that overall  tax burden  on enterprise may respond
differently to different types of taxation, and it is not merely a function of tax rates.
Secondly, and perhaps  more significantly, the institutional aspects of implementation  of the
tax regime may matter more than the statutory tax rate design issues; higher marginal
income tax rates in an honest and non-arbitrary  bureaucracy  may result in less tax burden
on the firm than lower statutory tax rates in a corrupt administration. This, in turn, helps
explain the complex effect of various measures  of  t  on the unofficial economy, since the
firm's mobility will be affected by the overall tax burden, and not merely by statutory tax
rates.
Does  a large  Unofficial  Economy  matter  for overall  economic  performance?
As auxiliary assumption  in our model we posited that, relative to unofficial activities,
the official economy may be more productive in generating public goods, and that private
official activities may tend to invest more. The corollary would then be that a smaller
official economy is associated  with higher rates of GDP growth.  Our preliminary  empirical
work, summarized  in table 8, supports such hypothesis.  The empirical relationship
appears  to be very robust across specifications.  The results suggest that a 20 percentage
point difference in the size of the unofficial economy can affect the annual growth rate to
the tune of  about 3-3.5%.  These  results are also very significant when controlling for
variables such as initial level of GDP per capita, rule of law, trade policies, the share of
government  revenues  in GDP  and even corruption.  Figure 19 presents  the residual plot
figure of the relationship  between GDP growth and the unofficial economy, controlling for
initial GDP  per capita levels.
We underscore  the preliminary nature of this line of investigation; further runs with
additional controls (such as investment ratio in GDP  and other policy variables) are  to be
performed  to confirm that the robustness  of the unofficial economy coefficient is
maintained. Further, we need  to address  issues of endogeneity,  since lower growth
performance  may be a contributor to a higher unofficial economy, and not just the reverse
causality.  And finally, we need to note that official GDP  data often underestimates  the
size of the unofficial economy.  Insofar as the unofficial economy grew over the relevant
period at a faster pace than the official economy (as it was the case in the FSU),  data on
GDP  growth is a lower bound estimate of overall growth and our estimates would be
biased  upwards (if interpreted as the effect of the unofficial economy on overall growth--
they would be a better proxy for official economy growth estimates instead).
However, if the results can be validated by further tests, the implications are
significant.  Much has been written about the significant impact of corruption on growth
in recent years (e.g. Mauro 1995 and 1997;  Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Tanzi and Davoodi
1  997).  Many channels whereby corruption negatively affects growth are proposed in these
writings, such as lower overall investment, increased  misallocation  of talent and resources,
23excessive  and unproductive public investments, reduced  recurrent public expenditures (as
key complement  to public investments) and quality of infrastructure, and as also suggested
here supporting Tanzi and Davoodi's findings, through reduced  public revenues.  Our
framework of analysis and initial findings in table 8 suggest an important additional channel
whereby corruption may affect growth, namely  the unofficial economy.  Corruption and
bribery was shown to affect significantly the firms' mobility decision to the unofficial
economy. And in turn, as suggested  empirically in the controlled multiple regressions  in
table 8, the importance  of the unofficial economy appears  to matter more directly and
significantly (than other variables) in negatively influencing the country's growth prospects.
VI.  Conclusions  and Implications.
The empirical study  of unofficial  activities,  corruption  and other institutional
variables virtually  by definition  faces the  daunting challenge of data  availability  and
reliability.  Thus,  we need to caution  against definitive  conclusions  or specific  policy-
making  on the  basis of the empirical work  presented here.  Additional  empirical work  is
required, including  in depth  country  specific  researsh for specific  policy  design.
We have attempted  to compensate  for the existing  data deficiencies  by utilizing  a
wide  array of indices to measure the  variables in our framework.  These indices and
measures are drawn  from  multiple independent  sources, and we  have discussed  in detail its
characteristics.  Perhaps surprisingly-given  the  "noise'  expected  a priori  in much of this
data-,  we find  that  overall the variables in our public  finance framework  align themselves
rather  well with  each other,  and explain much of the variance  of the  unofficial  economy  in
fifty  countries.
The theoretical  model of Johnson,  Kaufmann, and Shleifer  (1997)  had three main
predictions,  which  find  at least some support  in this data set for a broader set of countries
in Latin America,  OECD and transition  economies.  First, countries  with  more regulation
tend  to have higher share of the unofficial  economy  in total  GDP.  Second, there is strong
support for the  proposition  that  countries  with  more corruption  tend to  have a larger
unofficial  economy.  Third, the  model predicts that  countries  with  a higher tax  burden
tend to  have a larger unofficial  economy.  The model again finds  support,  with  this  broader
data set,  but only if  we are careful  in how  we define the  "tax  burden",  and we consider  its
interaction  with  the regulatory  environment  and the  bureaucratic  implementation  of
policies.  Higher marginal income and corporate  tax  rates do not appear to  be associated
with  higher overall tax  burden as perceived  by the firms themselves.  Similarly,  so far we
find  no evidence suggesting  a significant  effect  of labor regulations.  By contrast,
international  trade taxes, as well as the trade and overall regulatory burden on the firm
(registration,  licenses, etc.) do affect the firm's decision to move to the unofficial economy.
Perhaps  more significantly, discretion  in the application  of the tax regime, and
administrative corruption, may matter more for the overall  tax burden on enterprise  than
marginal income or corporate tax rates per se.  Just as predicted by the model, we find
smaller unofficial economies in countries with higher  tax revenue (in turn the outcome of a
lower tax, regulatory and bribery "burden" on enterprise),  and with better rule of law
(financed  by tax revenues).
The nature of tax data and our simple OLS  regressions  do not allow a definitive
explanation  of the causal mechanism  between regulatory and tax burdens and the unofficial
24economy, but the most likely explanation  is as follows.  The mere  level of tax rates (and
even possibly  just the extent of regulations  per se) in themselves  do not cause the type of
politicization of the economy which forces firms underground. Much more depends on how
taxation and regulations  are administered  and implemented.  For example, higher income
countries can afford to run administrative systems "well," which means  using clear rules
and minimizing  the discretion of lower level officials.  It definitely helps that these countries
have a strong legal tradition because  this reduces  opportunities  to arbitrarily apply
regulations  and taxes and therefore limits the scope for bribery.  They can thus "afford" a
higher degree  of complexity in their tax and regulatory regimes,  which when
administratively well run, will not necessarily  translate into a higher overall tax burden  on
the firm.
In emerging and transition economies,  higher levels of regulation lead to a
significantly higher incidence  of bribery. This amounts to a higher effective tax on official
activity and therefore induces  firms to move into the unofficial economy.  Moving to the
unofficial economy undermines  public finance and further weakens  the ability of the state
to protect property rights.  These  recursive linkages suggest that there are two types of
institutional outcomes, with major implications for public finance and the unofficial
economy.
First, there are economies with relatively fair, moderate  and well run tax regimes,
with relatively light and non-discretionary  regulatory frameworks, low corruption and
bribery, substantial revenue mobilization  and relatively good provision of public goods in the
official sector.  Not surprisingly, most of the countries of the OECD  exhibit this good
overall institutional outcome; more  surprising is that already  some countries in Eastern
Europe,  such as Poland  and the Czech Republic,  find themselves moving towards this
"good equilibrium".  In Latin America, only an exception such as Chile would be in this
group.  And second, there are economies  with relatively high tax burden  on the enterprise
sector, onerous  and discretionary regulations, high prevalence  of bribery and corruption,
and relatively poor provision of key public goods such as rule of law.  These are
concentrated  in the former Soviet Union, yet a number  of countries in Latin America are
also in this group.  Comparing  these two groups "good" vs. "bad" equilibrium, the former
has a much lower share of unofficial activity than the latter.  As argued analytically and
empirically  in this paper and in JKS, this matters significantly, since the unofficial economy
is a key indicator of overall economic, institutional and public finance outcomes.  Further,
we find evidence  suggesting that a lower unofficial economy is significantly associated
with higher rates of GDP  growth.  The unofficial economy may in fact be an important
conduit of the negative effect of corruption and bribery on growth
Indeed,  these findings pinpoint the crucial difference between OECD,  some countries
in Eastern  Europe,  a few exceptions in Latin America, on the one hand, with the countries
in the former Soviet Union and many in Latin America on the other, regarding  the progress
of institutional  reform  and institution-building.  The central  policy question  is therefore  how
to make  the "good" scenario  (the first described  above) come true in many countries still
stuck in (or moving too slowly away from) the institutional "bad equilibrium" of the second
scenario.  A number of specific areas of policy intervention suggest themselves  from our
analysis, particularly in tax, regulatory, legal and anti-corruption institutional reforms.
Before  turning to the specific areas for domestic policy and institutional reforms, let
25us consider  the possible strategy of drawing on large scale foreign assistance  or borrowing.
The argument would be that given the importance of Q in our model, and that it is not
highly revenue-demanding  to generate  the core of Q  (e.g. rule of  law) needed  to move
from a bad equilibrium to a better one, outside financing may substitute more difficult and
time-consuming  domestic reforms.  The problem with this strategic option is that  foreign
economic  assistance  does not, by itself, assure  the transition to growth through
improvements  in the budget situation.  The political environment  can lead to a very poor
rate of conversion of public money into public goods.  The domestic political, institutional
and economic  parameters  are key to assure  better revenue  mobilization, less onerous
overall effective tax burden  on enterprise, and better conversion  of public revenues  to
public goods.
Our analysis  suggests that reforms must focus primarily on the elimination of the
distortions associated  with the existing government  activities, including  tax collection, and
on the effectiveness of conversion of the available  public revenues  into market-supporting
public goods. This approach would correspond  to an upward shift in the Q (T) function in
our  model, which, if  politically feasible and large enough, can eliminate the bad
equilibrium.  A central measure  to affect an upward shift in the Q function would be
improved  rule of law institutions, for which improved  public expenditure  allocation would
be warranted, as well as innovative legal and other than legal initiatives that account for
the weaknesses  in existing judiciary institutions.
One implication suggested  by our analysis  is that tax and regulatory blueprints
borrowed from fully industrialized  countries are unlikely to work in many emerging
economies,  at least not until they attain a certain level of institutional and bureaucratic
sophistication (and lack of arbitrary discretion and  rent-seeking). At a general level, for the
case of taxes, our framework and evidence  suggests that tax regimes need  to be designed
to ensure  effective and non-discretionary  implementation. Thus, simplicity, relative
uniformity,  elimination of special exemptions  and exceptions would be called for in a
number of settings.  Further, our results are at least suggestive of the need  to explore
further the question of the differential impact of different types of taxes on the firm's tax
burden and on the evolution of the unofficial economy.  For instance, trade taxes may
prove to be particularly onerous  relative to others.
Integrating the unofficial economy into an overall analysis  of emerging economies
may also points to more specific suggestions  related to taxation.  In reality, our model's
assumption  of official taxes being levied only on official activities is restrictive; in practice
different types of taxes have different potential to tax unofficial activities.  For instance,
value added  at source, as well as toll road taxes are likely to many as well, in contrast
with, say, income taxes.  Countries  which already exhibit a very high unofficial economy
may find beneficial  to emphasize  further the use of these types of taxes.
The existence of administrative corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies in many
settings also affects the "conventional" positive relationship  between tax rates and revenue
mobilization.  Programs  to reduce  administrative corruption and improve the bureaucracy
(including, but not exclusively, enhancing  tax administration)  may have larger payoffs in
many countries than mere changes  in tax rates.  Similarly, regulatory reforms are likely to
have significant payoffs.  Elimination  of socially unproductive regulations, instituting a one-
stop firm registration process, implementing  simplified, transparent and market-based
26environmental  regulations are all likely to result in reduced  corruption and bribery, less
overall regulatory  tax burden  on the firm, better revenue  mobilization  and more  firms
staying in the official economy.
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Trade Barriers  b  (Heritage)  10.11]  [0.15]
Corruption
Transparency International  0.18*  0.14**
Corruption Index (extended)  a  [0.04]  [0.8]
ICRG  Corruption Index  a  0.28*  0.11
[0.10]  [0.14]
Global Competitiveness  0.38*  0.44*
Survey Bribery Index  a  [0.08]  [0.14]
R-Squared  0.06  0.26  0.03  0.22  0.27  0.27  0.37  0.38  0.31  0.32  0.17  0.24  0.42  0.42
Number of Observations  39  39  37  37  34  34  39  39  39  39  38  38  34  34
Notes: OLS Regressions;  standard errors are in parentheses;  *  denotes significant at 5% level and **  denotes significant at  10% level
a) A higher value of this variable  stands for a better score for private business.
b) A higher value of this variable stands for a worse score for private business.
c) Note that this Trade Barrier Index also captures  non-tariff  impediments and as such it is not only and index of tax rates.
coTABLE  8-DOES THE  UNOFFICIAL  ECONOMY  AFFECT  PERFORMANCE?
Independent  Variable:  Dependent  Variable:  Growth  of Income  per  Capita
Log  of Initial  GDP  per  capita  -1.87**  -1.74  -2.84*  -0.75  0.16  -3.18*  -3.26*  -2.54*  -1.62  -2.66*  -3.23*
-[1.08]  (1.141  [0.781  [0.711  [0.951  [1.191  [0.791  (1.091  [1.17]  [1.18]  [0.811
Unofficial  Economy  [%GDP]  -0.12*  -0.19*  -0.22*  -0.16*  -0.17*  -0.20*  -0.21  *  -0.16*
(0.041  [0.061  10.071  [0.061  [0.07]  [0.07]  (0.071  [0.061
Transparency  International  0.84**  0.22  -0.22
Corruption  Index  [extended]  a  [0.471  [0.52]  [0.551
Rule  of Law  d  (ICRGI  2.37*  0.90  0.84
(0.611  [0.84]  [0.88]
Tariff and  Non-Tariff  Trade  -2.31*  -1.88*  -1.57**  -0.19
Barriers 'b, [Heritage]  [0.721  [0.831  [0.841  [0.60]
Government  Revenues  0.02  -0.05
as a percent  of GDP  10.071  10.08]
R-Squared  0.13  0.18  0.07  0.27  0.17  0.006  0.30  0.43  0.31  0.19  0.36  0.43
Number  of Observations  49  48  48  45  53  55  42  38  46  48  42  38
Notes:  OLS  Regressions;  standard  errors  are  in parentheses;  * denotes  significant  at 5% level  and  * *  denotes  significant  at 10% level
a) A higher  value  of this  variable  stands  for a better  score  for private  business.
bl A higher  value  of this variable  stands  for a worse  score  for private  business.
c) Note that this Trade  Barrier  Index  also  captures  non-tariff  impediments  and  as such  it is not only  and  index  of tax rates.List of Figures:
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Figure 2: Unofficial Economy and Tax Barriers
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Figure 10: Bureaucratic  Quality and Government Revenues
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45Figure  11: Rule of Law and Government  Revenues
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Figure  14: Government  Revenues  and Taxes  on Trade
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47Figure 15: Government Revenues and Tax Burden on Firms
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Figure  16: Tax  Burden  on the  Firm  and  Top  Marginal  Tax  Rate
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Figure  18:  Tax  Burden  on the  Firm  and  Transparency
International  Corruption  Index  (extended)
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Transparency  International  Corruption  Index (extended)
49Figure  19: GDP Growth and Unofficial Economy
(Controlling for Initial Income)
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Note:  Added  variable plot, partial regression  leverage plot:  Each axis represent  the residuals of the regressions  of each
variable against initial GDP per  capita
50TABLE  Al  -BASIC  DATA  FOR  SELECTED  VARIABLES
Country,  Unofficiai~  Top  Tariff  and  Tax  Regulatory  'Regulations'  Freedom:  Labor  Rule  Property  Bureaucrati
alphabetical  Economy;  Marginal  Non-Tarif  fBurden  Burden  on  (Heritage)  of  Firms  'Regulations.'  of  Rights  Quality
order  within  %  Share  Income  Trade  Reported:  Firms  to  Hiring  and  Law  (Heritage)  (ICRGI
regions:  Latin.  in  GDP  :Tax  Rate  Barriers  by Firms;  (GCS97)  Compete;  Firing  (ICRG)
America,  (Fraser  (Heritage)  (GCS97)  (Fraser):  Practices
Transition  Index)  (GCS97)
Econs.,
OEC  D  _  _  _  _  _  _  - _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ Argetn  21.80  9  4  2.67  42  10.0  3.02  4.06  2  3.00
,olivia  65.60  10  2  .. 4  7.5  ..  2.06  3  1.50
JraZiI  3~~~~  ~~  ~  ~~~7.80  8  4  _22  3.33  7.5  4.38  3.38  3  4.00
-hile  18.20  4  2  3.40  4.25  2  10.0  4.54  4.44  1  3.13
-olombia  35.10  8  4  2.14  1.643  7.5  3.11  14  3  4.00
-osta  Rica  23.30  9  4  22  2.27  3100  4.13  4.00  3  3.00
E'cu'a'do'r  31.20  9  3  I-  ..  4  7.5  . 4.00  3  3.00
Guatemala  50~~~~~~~~~~~~~6.40.  .. ......8  3  2.49  2.54  - 5.0  4.6  2.25  3  *14
Honduras  146.70  7  41.71  2247.530  263  2.00
Me-xic'o*  27.10  7  3  3.06  3.37  4  7.5  3.75  ,3.00  3  - 3.00
Panama  62.10  .........  .....  ...  ..  ...........  ....  ......--  3  7.5  .. 2.63  3  1.44
Peru  ~~~~~~~~~---57.90, 8  3  2.1 3  3.75  4  7.5  5.16  2.19  3  - 200
Urguay  352,  12-  .. 37.5  . 3.00  2  - 2.25
Venezuela  30.80  7  4  3.09  2.67  3  7.5  2.78  4.00  33OC
Azerbaijan  I60.60  ..  4  ...  .4
Belarus  19.30  ........  3  ... 3... .............. Bugaria  36.20  3  5.00  3  3.00
Czech  Rep.  11  ......  ......  ....  .6  47  1.  2.76  5".  44  2  3.94
Esto-nia  .11.80  I:  8.  ..  . ...... 2  10.0  2
Geo'rgi'a  62.606  ... ........  4  ...  .4
Hungary  29.00--  4  4  2.38  2.85  3  10.0  4.88  5.38  2  4.38 Kaza-khst'an  3-4.-306  ........  ...  .. Latvia  35.30  7  4  1  .27.5  3
Lithua'n  a  21.60  - 7  2  .3  7.5  I  . . 3
0 ~  ~  3.3  .....  3
Poland  12~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~.60  4  4.  221  4.06  1  37.5  4.00  51  0
Roma  n  ia  -"19.10  - 1  2  .-  4  5.0  . 4.31  4  2.00
R'ussia'  4 1.6-0-  -8-5  180  4.05  ......... 45.0  4.08  3.50  3  3.19
S(ova k  Rep  5.80  4  2  3.45i4.00  3  7.5  3.64  5.60  3  3.40
Ukrain-e-  48.9 0  I  4  158  2.86  45.0  5.26  . 4
Uzbekistan  6.50  ..  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Austria  58  4  3  3.84  3.63  3  75  3.29  6.00  1  6.00
Belgium  15.25  12£,2.32  3.21  3  7.5  2.96  5.88  1  6.00
Canada  10.00  4  2  3.34  3.77  75  48  .0  160
Denmark"  9.38  2  3.06  4.2992  10.0  5.88  6.00,  1  . 6.00
France  1.40  4  2  2.58  2.91  275  2.44  55  . 5.88
Ge+r  m"a  n  y  10.3,  32  2.39  3.56  3  7.5  2.34  5.75  1  6.00
Grece  2720  5  2  2.58I225  ,  37.5,  2.58  48  :  38
Ireland  7.80  3  2  3.07  3.80  2  7.5  3.73  5.44  1  5.88
Italy  20.40  1  ,3  1.89  2.89  3  7.5  2.22  5.25  2  4.81
Japan  8.50  2  2  2.56  2.67  I  27.5  4.1 5  5.69  1  5.88
Netherlands  11.75  2  2  4.19  4.78  2  7.5  3.16  6.00  1  6.00
Nowy  5.93  5  3  4.27  4.67  3  7.5  2.60  60  4
orual  15.0  5  .8  4.55  3  7'.5.1  5.3 1  2  - 3.88
Spain  16.05  ~~~~~~~~~~~2  2  3.82  - 5.29  3  75  3.53  5.25  2  4.25
Sweden  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~10.63  1  i-  2  _  2.71  3.48  3  19.0  3.00  .6.00  2  6.00
S§wi'tzerla'nd-  :  6.-90  - 8  I  2  4.14  4.21  _  3  10.0  5.2  6.00  1  6.00
U.K.  7.15  52~  4.60  4.37  2  10.0  4.91  5.75  1  6.00
U. S..A.,  13.87  7  2  23.4  4  3.39.....2  10.0  5.05  6.00.1  .00I
I
I
IPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2149  Income Gains to the Poor from  Jyotsna Jalan  July 1999  P. Sader
Workfare: Estimates for Argentina's  Martin Ravallion  33902
Trabajar Program
WPS2150  Who Wants to Redistribute? Russia's  Martin Ravallion  July 1999  P. Sader
Tunnel Effect in the 1990s  Michael Lokshin  33902
WPS2151  A Few Things Transport Regulators  Ian Alexander  July 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Should Know about Risk and the Cost  Antonio  Estache  36370
Of Capital  Adele Oliveri
WPS2152  Comparing the Performance of Public  Antonio  Estache  July 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
and Private Water Companies in the  Martin A. Rossi  36370
Asia and Pacific Region: What a
Stochastic Costs Frontier Shows
WPS2153  The Mystery of the Vanishing  Martin Ravallion  July 1999  P. Sader
Benefits: Ms. Speedy Analyst's  33902
Introduction to Evaluation
WPS2154  Inter-Industry Labor Mobility in  Howard Pack  August 1999  H. Sladovich
Taiwan, China  Christina Paxson  37698
WPS2155  Lending Booms, Reserves, and the  Barry Eichengreen  August 1999  S. Kpundeh
Sustainability of Short-Term Debt:  Ashoka Mody  39591
Inferences from the Pricing of
Syndicated Bank Loans
WPS2156  How Has Regionalism  in the 1990s  Isidro Soloaga  August 1999  L. Tabada
Affected Trade?  L. Alan Winters  36896
WPS2157  How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded  Won Chang  August 1999  L.Tabada
Countries: The Price Effects of  L. Alan Winters  36896
MERCOSUR
WPS2158  The Effect of Foreign Entry on  George R. G. Clarke  August 1999  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Argentina's Domestic Banking  Robert Cull  38526
Sector  Laura D'Amato
Andrea Molinari
WPS2159  Provincial Bank Privatization in  George R. G. Clarke  August 1999  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Argentina: The Why, How, and  Robert Cull  38526
"So What?"
WPS2160  Protecting the Poor from  Francisco Ferreira  August 1999  PREM
Macroeconomic Shocks  Giovanna Prennushi  87736
Martin RavallionPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2161  Will the Real "Natural Trading  Maurice Schiff  August 1999  M. Kasilag
Partner" Please Stand Up?  39081
WPS2162  Quantifying the Fiscal Effects  Shantayanan Devarajan  August 1999  H. Sladovich
of Trade Reform  Delfin S. Go  37698
Hongyi Li
WPS2163  Coverage under Old-Age Security  Estelle James  August 1999  M. Leenaerts
Programs and Protection for the  84264
Uninsured - What Are the Issues?
WPS2164  Challenging El Salvador's Rural  Maureen Lewis  August 1999  M. Lewis
Health Care Strategy  Gunnar S. Eskeland  39080
Ximena Traa-Valerezo
WPS2165 The Russian City in Transition:  Martha de Melo  August 1999  H. Sladovich
The First Six Years in 10 Volga  Gur Ofer  37698
Capitals
WPS2166  Seeking Votes: The Political  Norbert R. Schady  August 1999  N. Schady
Economy of Expenditures by the  88247
Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES),
1991-95
WPS2167  Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital  Deepa Narayan  August 1999  B. Jones
and Poverty  39475
WPS2168  Wage and Productivity Gaps:  Dorte Verner  August 1999  H. Vargas
Evidence from Ghana  37871